Against the backdrop of the protracted war against Ukraine, Russia is applying a new logic when selecting top officials for its regional administration. Recent appointments in Western regions favor officials with military backgrounds and experience working in Russia-occupied territories, signaling that the Kremlin has no intention of changing course.

The fifth year of Russia’s war against Ukraine is transforming the logic of regional governance and gubernatorial management in Russia. Recent appointments in the regions bordering Ukraine point to a growing preference for officials with military backgrounds and experience working in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Although this pattern is not yet evident in other regions, it suggests that these credentials increasingly outweigh other considerations. These appointments signal that the war remains a central priority for the Kremlin and that it has no intention of changing course despite the rising costs inside Russia. The same shift can be seen in last week’s State Duma elections, in which candidates presented as veterans of the war in Ukraine won 46 out of 450 seats. More broadly, these developments point to a militarization of Russian politics, as war-related credentials increasingly open doors to political office.

Kursk: a rapid turnover and shifted responsibility

Although Russian governors are formally elected, the Kremlin, in practice, decides who governs and for how long. In Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian forces entered and temporarily occupied part of the region in August 2024, the governor was replaced twice that year. The rapid turnover in regional leadership, together with the widening corruption investigations1, suggests that the Kremlin has assigned responsibility for the crisis largely to regional officials. The first gubernatorial replacement in Kursk was routine and took place in May 2024. Following his own reelection, President Vladimir Putin appointed Roman Starovoit, then in his first term as governor, federal transport minister. Starovoit’s first deputy, Alexey Smirnov, succeeded him. Smirnov’s tenure, however, was short-lived. He resigned in December, only a few months after the Ukrainian incursion, with parts of the region remaining under Ukrainian control – Russian forces regained the occupied territory only in April 2025. To replace Smirnov, the Kremlin appointed Aleksander Khinstein, then a deputy in the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. He worked primarily on issues related to security, anti-corruption, and oversight of law enforcement. Khinstein was a so-called outsider governor, having neither lived nor worked in the region prior to taking office. His selection was consistent with the pre-war practice of appointing outsiders as regional governors. By 2020, governors appointed from outside the region already outnumbered locally recruited appointees.2

In the meantime, investigations into corruption and abuse of office gathered momentum in the region. They focused on the regional development corporation and contractors suspected of misusing funds allocated for border fortifications, including the anti-tank barriers known as “dragon’s teeth,” whose construction began following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Several corporation officials had been arrested by the end of 2024. The investigations later widened to include senior regional officials. In April next year, Smirnov and his former deputy were detained on fraud charges linked to spending on the border fortifications. Starovoit’s earlier tenure as governor also came under scrutiny. Investigators examined allegations that funds for the construction of border fortifications had been misused while he was in office. Starovoit died by suicide three months later, in July. He was found dead in his Tesla. The timing, together with Putin’s decision to dismiss him as transport minister earlier that day, fueled speculation that Starovoit feared becoming the investigation’s next target.3 Meanwhile, the case against ex-governor Smirnov and his former deputy continued into the following year. In April 2026, a court sentenced Smirnov to 14 years in prison and imposed a fine of 400 million rubles (ca. €4.25 million).4 His deputy received a 17-year sentence and a fine of 450 million rubles (ca. €4.79 million).5 While Russian intelligence appears to have failed to anticipate the Ukrainian incursion and the military was unable to contain it quickly, the political consequences have fallen largely on the regional leadership. By focusing on corruption, misuse of funds, and administrative failures in Kursk Oblast, the Kremlin has shifted responsibility onto regional officials, drawing attention away from broader intelligence and military failures.

Bryansk: a face-saving exit

A similar, though less dramatic, pattern unfolded in neighboring Bryansk Oblast. Corruption investigations there centered on the construction of border fortifications. In July 2025, law enforcement authorities detained a vice-governor, Nikolay Simonenko, and the head of the regional capital construction department, Yevgeny Zhur, on charges related to embezzlement and abuse of office. A year later, a Moscow court sentenced Simonenko to nine years and nine months in prison, while Zhur received a sentence of nine and a half years.6 The governor, however, left office on far more favorable terms. Aleksandr Bogomaz had been in office since 2014 and had secured a third term in September 2025. Yet he resigned in May 2026 and became a State Duma deputy the following day. By accepting his resignation and facilitating his immediate move to the federal legislature, the Kremlin gave Bogomaz a face-saving exit and allowed him to retain a position at the federal level. His departure followed years of wartime pressure on Bryansk Oblast, which had faced repeated shelling and several unsuccessful attempts by Ukrainian forces to cross the border. Bogomaz was replaced on an interim basis by Egor Kovalchuk, an outsider with no previous ties to the region. Kovalchuk had previously held various regional and municipal positions before being appointed in 2024 to lead the government of the Russian-occupied Luhansk region in Ukraine. By moving Kovalchuk directly from occupied Luhansk to Bryansk, the Kremlin likely signaled that it now values such experience when making senior regional appointments. Kovalchuk was subsequently elected governor of Bryansk Oblast with 67.52 percent of the vote in the elections held alongside the State Duma elections.

Belgorod: a warrior succeeds an effective manager

This wartime logic was even more evident in Belgorod Oblast, where Aleksandr Shuvaev was appointed interim governor on 13 May 2026, the same day as Kovalchuk in Bryansk. Unlike Kovalchuk, however, Shuvaev was born in Belgorod Oblast, even though he had built his military career outside the region. Shuvaev had taken part in combat operations in the North Caucasus and Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia before serving in Syria and in the war against Ukraine from 2022. He rose to the rank of major general and received the title Hero of the Russian Federation in 2025. He had also participated in the Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” programme, designed to bring military veterans into public office. Although only a small number of participants had so far reached top regional positions, Shuvaev advanced rapidly.7 In January 2026, he was appointed deputy governor of Irkutsk Oblast in Siberia to oversee mobilization planning and territorial defense. Four months later, Shuvaev was appointed acting governor of Belgorod Oblast, a move that appeared to mark a shift in the Kremlin’s approach to governing the region. His predecessor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, had entered office as a civilian governor and had to adapt after the war reached the region. Shuvaev, by contrast, arrived with a military background and direct combat experience. The signal was clear: the Kremlin now wanted a military figure in charge of one of Russia’s war-affected border regions. Yet military experience does not necessarily translate into effective regional governance. It creates a clear trade-off between the symbolic value of appointing a decorated officer and the practical demands of managing a region under continuous wartime pressure.  

As I show in another article, Gladkov, who took office in 2020, proved effective at managing the region after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.8 Belgorod Oblast felt the effects immediately, as the regional capital lies around 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian border and roughly 70 kilometers from Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city. Although Gladkov was himself an outsider when appointed, he developed a reputation for responding quickly to wartime challenges particularly through direct communication with residents. His Telegram channel became one of the most widely cited gubernatorial channels in Russia. With the start of the war, he published more posts than any other governor and at times attracted more citations than the Russian Ministry of Defense. By 2026, the channel had nearly half a million subscribers. It became more than a communications tool. Many residents learned about air strikes, casualties, evacuations, and official responses from the governor’s Telegram channel before information appeared elsewhere. Gladkov also posted frequent video addresses recorded directly on his phone, reinforcing the impression that he was personally present and continuously dealing with wartime emergencies.9

This communication system became harder to sustain from 2025, as mobile internet shutdowns intensified and the authorities sought to restrict Telegram while promoting the state-backed MAX messenger.10 Gladkov encouraged residents to move to MAX, but also warned that slowing Telegram disrupted the rapid flow of information on missile and drone attacks. He publicly supported residents’ complaints about internet restrictions and criticized MAX for lacking the functions needed to distribute urgent security alerts. He argued that this was a serious problem for all border regions and said he would discuss it with the federal authorities.11 These interventions may have created tensions with security agencies, which sought tighter control over wartime information, and may have contributed to the Kremlin’s decision to replace Gladkov. His departure, however, was not arranged as quickly as Bogomaz’s exit in Bryansk. Reports about Gladkov’s possible replacement began circulating in early April,12 but he remained in office until mid-May. This delay suggests that negotiations took place in Moscow over Gladkov’s fate as governor and the choice of his successor.13

Questions over his position persisted for several weeks as widening corruption investigations in Belgorod Oblast reached regional officials connected with the construction of anti-tank barriers. Among those detained were vice-governor Rustem Zainullin, who oversaw the regional construction sector, and former vice-governor Vladimir Bazarov. Both were described in the regional media as close associates of Gladkov.14 Only about six weeks after leaving office, Gladkov was appointed Russia’s ambassador to Abkhazia, considered by Moscow as an independent state but internationally recognized as part of Georgia. This appointment was quite unusual because he was not a career diplomat. While former governors have previously been appointed ambassadors, most notably to Belarus, such appointments remain relatively uncommon. Russia’s relations with Abkhazia are overseen within the Presidential Administration by Sergei Kirienko,15 suggesting that Gladkov’s appointment had his backing. The ambassadorship is also politically significant because Abkhazia depends heavily on Russia for security and economic support. Gladkov will therefore have considerable influence while advancing Moscow’s interests there. Shuvaev, meanwhile, secured the governorship with 65.97 percent of the vote.

Conclusion: a belligerent message

Overall, these developments in Russia’s border regions point to a broader wartime transformation of regional governance and gubernatorial management. The Kremlin is increasingly prioritizing officials with experience governing Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Military credentials are also taking precedence over other considerations. Although this pattern has so far emerged only in regions bordering Ukraine, the same wartime logic is likely to shape future appointments across Russia. Taken together, these appointments send an important message. They suggest that the war remains a central priority for the Kremlin and that it has no intention of changing course despite the rising costs inside Russia from Ukrainian drone attacks on oil refineries to strikes on logistics and storage facilities.

  1. Burkhardt, Fabian, Evgeny Miroshnichenko, Anastasiia P., et al. “Elite Repression in Wartime Russia: How and Why Are Officials Prosecuted.” Cedar Elites Lab Report No. 3, August 2026, https://cedarus.io/research/undefined/research/elite-repression  [↩]
  2. Kommersant. “Glavy regionov stali blizhe k tsentru: na gubernatorskuyu dolzhnost vse chashche perekhodyat s federalnykh pozitsiy (Regional heads are moving closer to the federal center: federal officials are becoming governors more often).” December 3, 2025 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8250927  [↩]
  3. Felgenhauer, Tatiana. 2025. “Samoubiystvo Starovoyta — Novaya Vekha Dlya Putinskoy Elity (Starovoyt’s Suicide Marks a New Turning Point for Putin’s Elite).” DW.com, August 7, 2025. https://www.dw.com/ru/samoubijstvo-eksministra-starovojta-novaa-veha-dla-putinskoj-elity/a-73197022  [↩]
  4. The Moscow Times. “Former Kursk Governor Alexei Smirnov Jailed 14 Years for Defrauding Government.” The Moscow Times, April 6, 2026. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/06/former-kursk-governor-alexei-smirnov-jailed-14-years-for-defrauding-government-a92436  [↩]
  5. Expert. “Eks-zamglavy Kurskoy oblasti Alekseya Dedova prigovorili k 17 godam kolonii (Former deputy governor of Kursk Oblast Alexey Dedov was sentenced to 17 years in prison).” Expert.ru, July 4, 2026. https://expert.ru/news/eks-zamglavy-kurskoy-oblasti-alekseya-dedova-prigovorili-k-17-godam-kolonii  [↩]
  6. Balandin, Roman. “Byvshemu Zamestitelyu Bogomaza Dali 9 Let Za Khishcheniya Na «zubakh Drakona» (Bogomaz’s Former Deputy Was Sentenced to Nine Years for Embezzlement Involving the ‘Dragon’s Teeth’ Fortifications).” RBK.RU, July 13, 2026. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/07/2026/6a5501759a7947e167446fc9  [↩]
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  8. Paustyan, Ekaterina. 2024. “Elite Cohesion and Resilience of the Russian Regions: The Case of Belgorod Oblast.” Post-Soviet Affairs 40 (4): 296–312. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2354940  [↩]
  9. Maslov, Andrey. “Chelovek, Kotoryy Govoril s Oblastyu Po Utram. Chto Posle Otstavki Ostavlyaet Belgorodtsam Gladkov? (The Man Who Spoke to the Region Every Morning. What Does Gladkov Leave behind for Belgorod Residents after Stepping Down?).” May 15, 2026. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/05/15/chelovek-kotoryi-govoril-s-oblastiu-po-utram  [↩]
  10. Rettig, Joana. “Warum Russland seine Bürger immer stärker vom Internet abschneidet.” WEB.DE News, March 30, 2026. https://web.de/magazine/politik/russland-krieg-ukraine/russland-buerger-staerker-internet-abschneidet-42065846  [↩]
  11. Maslov, “Chelovek, Kotoryy Govoril s Oblastyu Po Utram.” [↩]
  12. Mukhametshina, Yelena, and Denis Ivanov. “V prigranichnoy Belgorodskoy oblasti mozhet smenit’sya gubernator (The border Belgorod Oblast may get a new governor).” Vedomosti.ru, April 6, 2026. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2026/04/06/1188372-mozhet-smenitsya-gubernator  [↩]
  13. Diskein, Elena. «Nad Belgorodskoy Oblastyu Stavyat Kadrovyy Eksperiment». Politolog Vladimir Slatinov — o Naznachenii Aleksandra Shuvaeva (‘Belgorod Oblast Is Being Used for a Personnel Experiment.’ Political Scientist Vladimir Slatinov on the Appointment of Alexander Shuvaev). Fonar.Tv, May 14, 2026. https://fonar.tv/news/2026/05/14/nad-belgorodskoy-oblastyu-stavyat-kadrovyi-eksperiment-politolog-vladimir-slatinov-o-naznachenii-aleksandra-shuvaeva  [↩]
  14. Paustyan, Ekaterina. 2026. “Korruption und Elitennetzwerke in Russlands Grenzregionen während des Krieges.” Russland-Analysen, no. 475 (January): 7–8. https://laender-analysen.de/russland-analysen/475/korruption-elite-netzwerk-russlands-krieg/  [↩]
  15. Mukhametshina, Yelena. “Sergey Kirienko Stal Kuratorom Otnosheniy s Abkhaziey v Administratsii Prezidenta (Sergey Kirienko Has Become Responsible for Relations with Abkhazia in the Presidential Administration).” Vedomosti.Ru, March 3, 2025. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2025/03/03/1095495-kirienko-stal-kuratorom-otnoshenii-s-abhaziei  [↩]